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This paper characterizes the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks across countries of the euro
area, documents how this mechanism has changed with the introduction of the euro, and explores some
potential explanations. The factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) framework used is sufficiently rich
to jointly model the euro area dynamics while permitting the transmission of shocks to be different
across countries. We find important heterogeneity across countries in the effect of monetary shocks
before the launch of the euro. In particular, we find that German interest-rate shocks triggered stronger
responses of interest rates and consumption in some countries such as Italy and Spain than in Germany
itself. According to our estimates, the creation of the euro has contributed 1) to a greater homogeneity
of the transmission mechanism across countries, and 2) to an overall reduction in the effects of monetary
shocks. Using a structural open-economy model, we argue that the combination of a change in the
policy reaction function -- mainly toward a more aggressive response to inflation and output -- and
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On January 1st, 1999, the euro o¢ cially became the common currency for 11 countries of continental
Europe, and a single monetary policy started under the authority of the European Central Bank.1
The European Monetary Union2 (EMU) followed decades of monetary policies set by national
central banks to serve domestic interests, even though these national policies were constrained
by monetary arrangements such as the European Monetary System which was designed to limit
exchange rate ￿ uctuations. Approaching the tenth anniversary of the EMU, we begin to have
su¢ cient data to potentially observe e⁄ects of the monetary union on business cycle dynamics.
This paper has three objectives. The ￿rst is to characterize the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy in the Euro Area (EA) and across its constituent countries. The second is to
document how this transmission might have changed since the creation of the euro. The third
objective consists of providing a set of explanations, based on a structural open-economy model,
for the observed di⁄erences over time and across countries in the responses of key macroeconomic
variables.
Our ￿rst two objectives require an empirical model that captures empirically the EA-wide
macroeconomic dynamics, while allowing us to estimate the potentially heterogenous transmission
of EA shocks within individual countries. The factor-augmented VAR model (FAVAR) proposed
by Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) is a natural framework in this context. By pooling together
a large set of macroeconomic indicators from individual countries, it allows us to identify area-
wide factors, quantify their importance in the country-level ￿ uctuations, and trace out the e⁄ect of
identi￿ed aggregate shocks on all country-level variables. It also allows us to measure the spillovers
between individual countries and the EA.
Many papers have attempted to characterize the dynamics of European economies. One com-
mon strategy has been to modeling the EA economy using only EA aggregates. Examples include
evidence based on VARs (Peersman and Smets, 2003), more structural models (the ECB Area Wide
1At that date, the conversion rates of the national currencies of the Eurozone were ￿xed irrevocably, and a three-
year transition period started until the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins, in January 2002. Since then
other countries such as Greece, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus have adopted the euro.
2We refer to the EMU as the stage III of the European Monetary Union, which involves the launch of the euro in
January 1999.
1Model; Fagan, Henry and Mestre, 2005) and optimization-based macroeconomic models (Smets and
Wouters, 2003, Christiano et al., 2007; the New AWM; Coenen et al., 2007). Alternatively, authors
have estimated models using country-level data either to analyze the e⁄ects of various macroeco-
nomic shocks or for forecasting, using models of national central banks (Fagan and Morgan, 2006)
or VARs (e.g., Mihov, 2001; Mojon and Peersman, 2003).
An important feature of the FAVAR is that it allows us to model jointly the dynamics of
EA-wide variables and country-level variables within a single consistent empirical framework. In
that respect, we see our empirical strategy as an improvement over the numerous papers that
have compared impulse responses to shocks on the basis of models estimated separately for each
country (e.g., Angeloni, Kashyap, and Mojon, 2003. chap. 3 and 5). The estimated model suggests
that a signi￿cant fraction of country-level variables such as the components of output and prices,
employment, productivity and asset prices, can be explained by EA-wide common factors.
In order to characterize the monetary transmission mechanism, we identify unexpected mon-
etary policy shocks, and estimate their dynamic e⁄ects on the national macroeconomic variables.
We are particularly interested in documenting di⁄erences over time and across countries in the
sensitivity of national economies to such shocks. (In Appendix C, we also document the e⁄ects of
identi￿ed oil price shocks.) It is important to note that it is not because we believe that monetary
policy shocks constitute an important source of business cycle ￿ uctuations that we are interested in
documenting the e⁄ects of such shocks. In fact, much of the empirical literature ￿nds that monetary
shocks contribute relatively little to business cycle ￿ uctuations (e.g., Sims and Zha, 2006). Instead,
monetary policy a⁄ects importantly the economy through its systematic reaction to economic con-
ditions. The impulse response functions to monetary policy shocks provide a useful description of
the e⁄ects of a systematic monetary policy rule, by tracing out the responses of various macroeco-
nomic variables following a surprise interest-rate change, and assuming that policy is conducted
subsequently according to that particular policy rule.
The estimated monetary transmission mechanism is largely consistent with conventional wis-
dom. A monetary policy tightening in the EA as a whole or in Germany triggers an appreciation
of the exchange rate, a downward adjustment of demand and eventually of prices. For the period
preceding the EMU, we ￿nd considerable heterogeneity in the transmission of these shocks across
2countries. In particular, we ￿nd larger responses of long-term interest rates in Italy and in Spain,
which contribute to larger contractions of consumption in these two countries. Also, restrictive
monetary policy in the EA tended to trigger a depreciation of the lira and the peseta, and a smaller
decline of exports of these countries than in the rest of the EA.
The creation of the euro has contributed to an widespread reduction in the e⁄ect of monetary
shocks. In particular, long-term interest rates, as well as consumption, investment, output and em-
ployment respond less to short-term interest rate shocks in the new monetary policy regime, while
trade and the e⁄ective real exchange rate respond more strongly. While the monetary transmission
mechanism has become more homogenous along the yield curve, some striking asymmetries per-
sist, for instance in the response of national monetary aggregates to common interest rate shocks,
suggesting pervasive di⁄erences in national savings practices.
We use a structural open-economy model to explore some potential explanations for this evo-
lution of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. More precisely, we extend the model of
Ferrero, Gertler and Svensson (2007) with, among others, a risk premium on intra-area exchange
rates for the period prior to the EMU. This deviation from the uncovered interest rate parity is
necessary to replicate a larger response of Italian and Spanish interest rates to German monetary
shocks. Using a calibrated version of this model, we show that the combination of two ingredients
can replicate the evolution of the estimated transmission mechanism since the start of the EMU:
the elimination of the exchange-rate premium that plagued some of the European countries by ￿x-
ing the intra-area exchange rates, and a shift in monetary policy, mainly toward a more aggressive
response to in￿ ation and output. This latter ￿nding suggests that the change in the transmission
mechanism comes not only from the adoption of a single currency, but also from the ECB policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the econometric framework. It
discusses the formulation and estimation of the FAVAR and its relation to the existing literature.
In Section 3, we discuss the empirical implementation, describing the data used in our estimation,
our preferred speci￿cation of the FAVAR as well as its basic empirical properties. Section 4 studies
the e⁄ects of monetary shocks in the EA and in individual countries, and discusses their changes
since the creation of the EMU in 1999. Section 5 attempts to explain the cross-country di⁄erences
as well as the changes over time in the monetary transmission mechanism. Section 6 concludes.
32 Econometric Framework
We are interested in modeling empirically the EA wide macroeconomic dynamics, while allowing
heterogeneity in the transmission of EA shocks within individual countries. A natural framework
to achieve this goal is the factor-augmented vector autoregression model (FAVAR) described in
Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) (BBE). The model is estimated using indicators from individual
European economies as well as from the EA. The general idea behind our implementation is to
decompose the ￿ uctuations in individual series into a component driven by common European
￿ uctuations, and a component that is speci￿c to the particular series considered. EA-wide common
shocks can then be identi￿ed from the multi-dimensional common components. The FAVAR also
allows us to characterize the response of all data series to macroeconomic disturbances, such as
monetary policy shocks or oil price shocks. Importantly, by modeling jointly EA and country-level
dynamics, this framework allows each country￿ s sensitivity to EA shocks to be di⁄erent.
2.1 Description of the FAVAR model
We only provide here a general description of our implementation of the empirical framework and
refer the interested reader to BBE for additional details. We assume that the economy is a⁄ected
by a vector Ct of common EA-wide components to all variables entering the data set. Since we will
be interested in characterizing the e⁄ects of monetary policy, this vector of common components
includes a short-term interest rate, Rt; to measure the stance of monetary policy. Our speci￿cation
also includes the growth rate of an oil price index, ￿oil
t , as an observable factor. Both of these
variables are allowed to have pervasive e⁄ect throughout the economy and will thus be considered
as common components of all variables entering the data set. The rest of the common dynamics is
captured by a K￿1 vector of unobserved factors Ft; where K is relatively small. These unobserved
factors may re￿ ect general economic conditions such as ￿economic activity,￿the ￿general level of
prices,￿the level of ￿productivity,￿which may not easily be captured by a few time series, but
rather by a wide range of economic variables.3 We assume that the joint dynamics of ￿oil
t , Ft; and
3As long as a su¢ cient number of unobserved factors are included, the inclusion of oil-price in￿ ation as an
observable factor should not a⁄ect our results. It does however allow us to identify oil price shocks and document
their e⁄ects. We report such results in Appendix C.
4Rt are given by


















and ￿(L) is a conformable lag polynomial of ￿nite order which may contain a priori restrictions,
as in standard structural VARs. The error term vt is iid with mean zero and covariance matrix Q:
The system (1) is a VAR in Ct. The additional di¢ culty, with respect to standard VARs,
however, is that the factors Ft are unobservable. We assume that the factors summarize the
information contained in a large number of economic variables. We denote by Xt this N ￿1 vector
of ￿informational￿ variables, where N is assumed to be ￿large,￿ i.e., N > K + 2: We assume
furthermore that the large set of observable ￿informational￿series Xt is related to the common
factors according to
Xt = ￿Ct + et (2)
where ￿ is an N ￿(K + 2) matrix of factor loadings, and the N ￿1 vector et contains (mean-zero)
series-speci￿c components that are uncorrelated with the common components Ct. These series-
speci￿c components are allowed to be serially correlated and weakly correlated across indicators.
Equation (2) re￿ ects the fact that the elements of Ct; which in general are correlated, represent
pervasive forces that drive the common dynamics of Xt: Conditional on the observed short-term
interest rate Rt; the variables in Xt are thus noisy measures of the underlying unobserved factors
Ft: Note that it is in principle not restrictive to assume that Xt depends only on the current values
of the factors, as Ft can always capture arbitrary lags of some fundamental factors.4
The empirical model (1) and (2) provides a convenient decomposition of all data series into
components driven by the EA factors Ct (i.e., the short-term interest rate, oil prices and other
latent dimensions of aggregate dynamics, such as real activity and in￿ ation) and by series-speci￿c
components unrelated to the general state of the economies, et: For instance, (2) speci￿es that
4In fact, Stock and Watson (1999) refer to (2) as a dynamic factor model.
5indicators of country-level economic activity or in￿ ation are driven by a European interest rate,
EA latent factors Ft; and a component that is speci￿c to each individual series (representing,
e.g., measurement error or other idiosyncrasies of each series). The dynamics of the EA common
components are in turn speci￿ed by (1).
As in BBE, we estimate our empirical model using a variant of a two-step principal component
approach. In the ￿rst step, we extract principal components from the large date set Xt to obtain
consistent estimates of the common factors.5 Stock and Watson (2002) and Bai and Ng (2006)
show that the principal components consistently recover the space spanned by the factors when
N is large and the number of principal components used is at least as large as the true number
of factors. In the second step, we add the oil price in￿ ation and the short-term interest rate to
the estimated factors, and estimate the structural VAR (1). Our implementation di⁄ers slightly
from that of BBE as we impose the constraint that the observed factors (￿oil
t and Rt) are among
the factors in the ￿rst-step estimation.6 This guarantees that the estimated latent factors recover
dimensions of the common dynamics not captured by the observed factors.7
This procedure has the advantages of being computationally simple and easy to implement. As
discussed by Stock and Watson (2002), it also imposes few distributional assumptions and allows for
some degree of cross-correlation in the idiosyncratic error term et: Boivin and Ng (2005) document
the good forecasting performance of this estimation approach compared to some alternatives.8
5While alternative strategies to the estimation of factor models with a large set of indicators exist (see, among
others, Forni, Lippi, Hallin and Reichlin, 2000; Kose, Otrok and Witheman 2003; BBE; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006b;
Doz, Giannone and Reichlin, 2007), the evidence suggests that they perform similarly in practice.
6In contrast to the approach adopted here, BBE do not impose the constraint that the observed factors are among
the common components in the ￿rst step. They instead remove these observed factors from the space covered by the
principal components, by peforming a transformation of the principal components exploiting the di⁄erent behavior
of what they call ￿slow-moving￿and ￿fast-moving￿variables, in the second step. Our approach here follows Boivin
and Giannoni (2007) and Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov (2007).
7More speci￿cally, we adopt the following procedure in the ￿rst step of the estimation. Starting from an initial
estimate of Ft, denoted by F
(0)
t and obtained as the ￿rst K principal components of Xt; we iterate through the
following steps: (1) we regress Xt on F
(0)
t and the observed factors Yt = [￿
oil
t ;Rt]
0 to obtain ^ ￿
(0)
Y ; (2) we compute
~ X
(0)
t = Xt ￿ ^ ￿
0(0)
Y Yt; (3) we estimate F
(1)
t as the ￿rst K principal components of ~ X
(0)
t ; (4) we repeat steps (1)-(3)
multiple times.
8Note that this two-step approach implies the presence of ￿generated regressors￿in the second step. According
to the results of Bai (2003), the uncertainty in the factor estimates should be negligible when N is large relative to
T. Still, the con￿dence intervals on the impulse response functions used below are based on a bootstrap procedure
that accounts for the uncertainty in the factor estimation. As in BBE, the bootstrap procedure is such that 1) the
factors can be re-sampled based on the observation equation, and 2) conditional on the estimated factors, the VAR
coe¢ cients in the transition equation are bootstrapped as in Kilian (1998).
62.2 Interpreting the FAVAR structure
Various approaches have been used in the literature to model macroeconomic dynamics in the EA.
As we illustrate in this section, these approaches can be interpreted as special cases of the FAVAR
framework. Our approach thus merges some of the strengths of these existing approaches and
allows to answer a broader set of questions.
As in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) and in Boivin and Giannoni (2006b), we interpret
the common component Ct as corresponding to the vector of theoretical concepts or variables
that would enter a structural macroeconomic model of the EA. For instance, the structural open-
economy model that we consider in section 5.1 fully characterizes the equilibrium evolution of
in￿ ation, output, interest rates, net exports and other variables in two regions. In terms of the
notation in our empirical framework, all of these variables would be either included in Ct; or linear
combinations of the elements of Ct. The dynamic evolution of these variables can be approximated
by a VAR of the form (1).9
The existing approaches that model the dynamics of EA variables can be interpreted as special
cases of the FAVAR model, in the case that the elements of Ct are perfectly observed, so that the
system (1)￿ (2) boils down to a VAR. Interpreted in this way, the various existing empirical models
di⁄er about the assumptions they make about: the variables included in Ct, the indicators used to
measure Ct, and the restrictions imposed on the coe¢ cients of (1)￿ (2).
One approach is to assume that the element of Ct are observed and correspond to EA aggre-
gates.10 Such model can be estimated directly using a VAR on EA aggregates only (e.g. Peersman
and Smets, 2003), or a constrained version of a VAR corresponding, e.g., to the ECB Area Wide
Model (Fagan, Henry and Mestre, 2005), or even optimization-based macroeconomic models (Smets
and Wouters, 2003, Christiano et al., 2007; the New AWM; Coenen et al., 2006). Models estimated
only on EA aggregates are silent about the regional e⁄ects of a shock.
A second approach is to assume that the elements of Ct are observed and correspond to variables
9For a formal description of the link between the solution of a DSGE model in state-space form and a VAR
see, e.g., Sims (2000), and FernÆndez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ram￿rez, Sargent and Watson (2007). Boivin and Giannoni
(2006b) establish formally the link between DSGE models and the FAVAR representation (1)￿ (2) in the context of a
data-rich environment.
10The estimation of aggregate models for the EA has a relatively short history since there did not exist su¢ ciently
long historical time series of consistent EA national accounts before the launch of the euro and the publication of
Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2005). National accounts for the EA, published by Eurostat, start only in 1995.
7of di⁄erent regions. In that case, the FAVAR boils down to multi-country VARs and could be
estimated directly, as in, e.g., Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Scholl and Uhlig (2006).
A third approach is to assume that elements of Ct are observed and correspond to variables
of a speci￿c country. A large literature has in fact analyzed the cross-country di⁄erences in the
response of monetary policy using country-level models that are estimated separately (see Guiso
et al. 1999, Mojon and Peersman, 2003, Ciccarelli and Rebucci, 2006 and references therein). By
construction these models focus on country-speci￿c shocks and do not explicitly identify the e⁄ects
of EA-wide shocks such as changes in the stance of monetary policy that would a⁄ect all countries
simultaneously. The transmission of such shocks could potentially be ampli￿ed through trade and
expectation spillovers.11
Importantly, in all these cases, since the variables necessary to capture the EA dynamics are
observed, there is no need to use the large set of indicators Xt. However, there are reasons to
believe that some relevant macroeconomic concepts are imperfectly observed. First, some concepts
are simply measured with error.12 Second, some of the macroeconomic variables which are key for
the model￿ s dynamics may be fundamentally latent. For instance, the concept of ￿potential output￿
often critical in monetary models cannot be measured directly. By using a large data set, one is
able to extract empirically the components that are most important in explaining ￿ uctuations in
the entire data set. While each common component does not need to represent any single economic
concept, the common components Ct should constitute a linear combination of all of the relevant
latent variables driving the set of noisy indicators Xt to the extent that we extract the correct
number of common components from the data set.
An advantage of this empirical framework is that it provides summary measures of the state
of these economies at each date, in the form of factors which may summarize many features of
the economy. We thus do not restrict ourselves to summarizing the state of the economies with
particular measures of in￿ ation and of output. Another advantage, as BBE argue, is that this
framework should lead to a better identi￿cation of the monetary policy shock than standard VARs,
11van Els et al. (2003) show that spillovers across countries tend to reinforce the e⁄ects of monetary policy on
output and on prices. See also Fagan and Morgan (2006).
12Boivin and Giannoni (2006b) argue, for example, that in￿ ation is imperfectly measured by any single indicator,
and that it is important to use multiple indicators of it for proper inference.
8because it explicitly recognizes the large information set that the central bank and ￿nancial market
participants exploit in practice, and also because, as just argued, it does not require to take a
stand on the appropriate measures of prices and real activity which can simply be treated as latent
common components. Moreover, for a set of identifying assumptions, a natural by-product of the
estimation is to provide impulse response functions for any variable included in the data set. This
is particularly useful in our case, since we want to understand the e⁄ects of macroeconomic shocks
on a wide range of economic variables across EA countries.
Other papers have in fact followed a similar route. Sala (2001) estimates the e⁄ects of German
and EA composite interest-rate shocks using a factor model. He stresses large asymmetries in
the response of either output or prices to this shock. Favero et al. (2005) compare the e⁄ects of
monetary policy shocks on output and in￿ ation in Germany, France, Italy and Spain for alternative
speci￿cations of factor models. They ￿nd largely homogenous e⁄ects on output gaps and in￿ ation
rates across countries. Eickmeier and Breitung (2006) and Eickmeier (2006) characterize the e⁄ects
of common shocks on GDP and in￿ ation in 12 countries of the EA and in new European Union
members that will adopt the euro in the future. They conclude that these common shocks transmit
rather homogeneously across countries so that the remaining heterogeneity across EA countries
seems to originate in idiosyncratic shocks.
In contrast, in this paper we seek to better understand the role of the monetary policy regime in
explaining di⁄erent monetary transmissions across countries of the EA. In that regard, we believe
that countries of the EA, and their move toward a common currency, provide a unique experiment
for monetary economists. For this reason our focus is not strictly on the response of countries￿
GDPs and in￿ ation rates, but on many relevant dimensions of the economy. We thus seek to
take full advantage of the FAVAR structure to document the e⁄ect of various shocks on various
measures of real activity, such as GDP and its components, employment and unemployment, various
in￿ ation measures and ￿nancial variables. Although our scope is broader, our approach is similar to
McCallum and Smets (2007), who use a similar FAVAR to study the role national and sectoral labor
market characteristics imply wage rigidities that in￿ uence the monetary transmission mechanism.
93 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Data
The data set used in the estimation of our FAVAR is a balanced panel of 245 quarterly series, for
the period running from 1980:1 to 2007:3. We limited the sample to the six largest economies of
the EA, i.e., Germany, France, Italy, Spain the Netherlands and Belgium for which we could gather
a balanced panel of 33 economic quarterly time series that are available back to 1980. Given these
countries account for 90% of the EA population and output, we deem unlikely that the inclusion
of other EA countries would alter our estimates EA business cycle characteristics.
The 33 economic variables that we gathered for each country and the EA include two interest
rates, M1, M3, the e⁄ective exchange rate, an index of stock prices, GDP and its decomposition by
expenditure, the associated de￿ ators, PPI and CPI indices, the unemployment rate, employment,
hourly earnings, unit labor cost measures, capacity utilization, retail sales and number of cars sold.
In addition to these 231 country-level and EA-level variables, we also include an interest rate and
real GDP for the UK, the U.S. and Japan, the euro/dollar exchange rate, an index of commodity
prices and the price of oil. The database was mostly extracted from Haver. In a number of cases
the Haver data were backdated using older vintages of OECD databases. The de￿nition of the
variables, the source, and details about the data construction are given in Appendix A. The graphs
of the data are available in the appendix of the worker paper version of this paper.
We take year-on-year (yoy) growth rates of all time series except for interest rates, unemploy-
ment rates and capacity utilization rates. The yoy transformation is preferred to limit risks of noise
due to improper or lack of seasonal adjustment in the data.
3.2 Sample period
The choice of the sample period is delicate. On the one hand, our interest lies in characterizing
the monetary transmission in the period since the start of the monetary union, in January 1999.
We therefore have about 9 years of data that correspond to the strict monetary union. However,
the objective of stabilizing exchange rates within what would become the EA started much earlier.
In fact, already in the seventies, European governments set up mechanisms that aimed at limiting
10exchange rate ￿ uctuations within Europe.13 The march to the monetary union has been gradual and
each country has progressed at its own speed. The pegs of Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands
to the Deutsche mark were not realigned after the early 1980￿ s. The last realignment of the
French franc to core EMS currencies (the Deutsche mark, the Belgian Franc and the Dutch Crown)
took place in January 1987. Ex post, we know that the parity between the French Franc, the
Belgian Franc, the Dutch Guilder and the Deutsche Mark hardly changed at all since January
1987. However, a signi￿cant risk premium for fear of realignment plagued the French currency
until 1995. Finally, countries such as Italy and Spain ￿ as well as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and
Finland, which are not in our sample ￿ saw their currency ￿ uctuate vis-￿-vis their future partners
in the monetary union well into the 1990s. Although interest rates remained much higher in Italy
and Spain, than in Germany up until the mid 1990￿ s because of risk premia, changes in the interest
rates set by the Bundesbank would be echoed in domestic monetary conditions because of the
o¢ cial peg to the Deutsche Mark.
Another key aspect of the process of monetary integration is the degree of nominal convergence.
In￿ ation rates were much further apart in the 1970￿ s and early 1980￿ s than ever since.
For all these considerations, and to avoid capturing the large changes on nominal variables that
have occurred in the early 1980s, we propose to describe the e⁄ects of standard common shocks
starting in 1988. We will also contrast the results with estimates for a sample corresponding to the
strict monetary union regime starting in 1999.
3.3 Preferred speci￿cation of the FAVAR
For the model selection, the short sample size severely constrains the class of speci￿cations we
can consider, especially the number of lags in (1), as well as the number of latent factors. We
were thus forced to consider models with no more than 8 factors and 3 lags. Among those, our
approach has been to search for the most parsimonious model for which the key conclusions that
we emphasize below are robust to the inclusion of additional factors and lags. Based on this, our
preferred speci￿cation is one with a vector of common components Ct containing 5 latent factors
13Major steps in this process include the start of the EMS in 1979, the entrance of Spain and Portugal into the
EMS in 1986, the post-reuni￿cation exchange rate crisis of 1992-1993 and the announcement of the parities between
national currencies and the euro in May 1997.
11in addition to the short-term interest rate and oil price in￿ ation, and a VAR equation (1) with
one lag. As we show below, these common factors explain a meaningful fraction of the variance of
country-level variables.
3.4 European factors and EA-countries￿dynamics
To assess whether our FAVAR model provides a reasonable characterization of the individual series,
we now determine the importance of area-wide ￿ uctuations for individual countries. Note that from
equation (2), each of the variables Xit of our panel can be decomposed into a component ￿0
iCt which
characterizes the e⁄ects of EA-wide ￿ uctuations, and a component eit which is speci￿c to the series
considered:
Xit = ￿0
iCt + eit: (3)
It is important to note that each variable may be a⁄ected very di⁄erently by the multidimensional
vector Ct summarizing EA-wide ￿ uctuations, as the estimated vectors of loadings ￿i may take
arbitrary values. We ￿rst start by determining the extent to which key European variables are
correlated with EA factors over three samples. We then discuss how the importance of these factors
has changed over time. In the next section, we document how monetary shocks get transmitted to
the EA, and across the di⁄erent countries.
Several studies have recently attempted to determine the degree of comovement of a few macro-
economic series across countries.14 Forni et al. (2000) and Favero et al. (2005) show that a small
number of factors provides an e¢ cient information summary of the main economic time series both
at the EA level and for the 4 largest countries of the EA. Eickmeier (2006) and Eickmeier and
Breitung (2006) con￿rm these results but also stress that country-level in￿ ation and output ￿ uc-
tuations are somewhat less correlated with EA-wide common factors than their EA counterparts.
However, Agresti and Mojon (2003) show that the comovement of either consumption or invest-
ment across EA countries is smaller than the comovement of GDP. Hence the possibility that the
tightness of economic variables with the EA business cycle may be uneven across countries and
14For instance Kose, Otrok, Whiteman (2003), Stock and Watson (2005) study the comovement of output, con-
sumption and investment, respectively for a large panel of countries, and for G7 countries. Giannone and Reichlin
(2006) analyze the comovement of output across EA countries. In addition, the ECB is carefully monitoring real and
nominal heterogeneity across countries (Benalal et al, 2006).
12Euro Area Average R2 over countries
1987:1 1987:1 1999:1 1987:1 1987:1 1999:1
￿ 2007:3 ￿ 1998:4 ￿ 2007:3 ￿ 2007:3 ￿ 1998:4 ￿ 2007:3
Short-term interest rate 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00
Bond yield 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95
Stock price 0.65 0.71 0.91 0.61 0.77 0.88
REX 0.78 0.82 0.93 0.73 0.79 0.93
M1 0.43 0.65 0.73 0.42 0.65 0.53
M3 0.70 0.92 0.74 0.50 0.71 0.69
De￿ ator GDP 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.73 0.81 0.84
De￿ ator PCE 0.88 0.90 0.72 0.77 0.90 0.83
De￿ ator investment 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.63 0.71 0.75
De￿ ator exports 0.86 0.80 0.97 0.72 0.71 0.94
De￿ ator imports 0.93 0.89 0.99 0.82 0.78 0.97
CPI 0.94 0.97 0.90 0.78 0.91 0.83
Real GDP 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.79 0.84 0.90
Consumption 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.71 0.75 0.81
Public consumption 0.54 0.71 0.54 0.42 0.59 0.63
Investment 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.65 0.76 0.78
Exports 0.70 0.71 0.93 0.67 0.68 0.88
Imports 0.84 0.95 0.93 0.74 0.81 0.89
Employment 0.85 0.90 0.97 0.78 0.85 0.85
Unemployment rate 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.86 0.93 0.96
Hourly earnings 0.94 0.97 0.69 0.79 0.92 0.74
Unit labor costs 0.89 0.96 0.88 0.81 0.92 0.89
CAP 0.86 0.92 0.95 0.67 0.80 0.77
Retail 0.73 0.80 0.60 0.53 0.67 0.60
Table 1: R2 for regressions of selected series on common factors
across variables of di⁄erent kinds. This is why we consider a large number of economic variables,
rather than a couple of macroeconomic indicators in our analysis.
3.5 Comovements between European variables and EA factors
Table 1 reports the fraction of the volatility in the series listed in the ￿rst column, that is explained
by the 7 EA-wide factors Ct (i.e., 5 latent factors, the log change of the oil price, and the EA
short-term interest rate). This corresponds to the R2 statistics obtained by the regressions of these
variables on the appropriate set of factors.
The three columns labeled Euro Area report the R2 statistics obtained by regressing the re-
spective EA-wide series on the common factors for our entire sample, a subsample representing the
13period preceding the monetary union, and the sample starting in 1999 representing the period in
which the EMU is in place. These numbers indicate that most of the variables listed are strongly
correlated with the common factors, both before and after the monetary union.15 While the short-
term interest rate is a common factor by assumption, other key variables such as EA real GDP
growth, CPI in￿ ation, bond yields and the unemployment rate all have R2 statistics above 0.9. The
common factors therefore summarize quite well the information contained in these EA series. Not
all series are however as strongly correlated with the common factors. For instance the growth rate
of the monetary aggregate M1 and public consumption for the EA, with R2 statistics of only 0.43
and 0.54, display much less comovement with the common factors.
Instead of estimating latent factors from our large data set, we could alternatively impose
key EA macroeconomic variables such as GDP, consumption, in￿ ation, exchange rate, bond yield,
and unemployment as observed factors. Our proposed approach dominates, however, as the latent
factors explain a substantially larger share of the variance of our sample than intuitive combinations
of EA aggregates. The additional explanatory power of the latent factors amounts on average to
10 % of the variables￿variance.
The last three columns of Table 1 report the average across countries of the R2 statistics for the
relevant variables. The R2 statistics are overall lower than those for the entire EA area, as expected,
to the extent that each country has country-speci￿c features not summarized by the common factors
Ct; and which tend to average out when considering the EA as a whole. Nonetheless, the table
shows that on average over the six European countries, most of the variables are also strongly
correlated with the common factors. Again, for the entire sample, country-level measures of GDP
growth, short and long interest rates, in￿ ation, employment and unemployment all show on average
high degrees of comovement with the common factors, while growth rates of M1, M2 and public
consumption show much lower degrees of comovement.
One might think that the relatively low R2 statistics for M1 and M3 re￿ ect the fact that our
panel includes a relatively small number of series of monetary aggregates. This intuition is however
incorrect. If monetary aggregates constituted an important source of ￿ uctuations for a wide range
of variables in our panel, then the R2 for the monetary aggregate series should be high even if
15Camacho et al. (2006) argue however that the EA business cycle largely re￿ ects the world business cycle.
141987:1-2007:3 1987:1￿ 1998:4 1999:1￿ 2007:3
Euro-Area 0.83 0.88 0.87
Germany 0.69 0.77 0.82
France 0.76 0.84 0.87
Italy 0.73 0.82 0.79
Spain 0.76 0.84 0.78
Netherlands 0.64 0.74 0.86
Belgium 0.68 0.79 0.84
Table 2: Average R2 for regressions of selected series on EA factors
no such series was used for the estimation of the latent factors. In this case, the estimated latent
factors should be capturing the common movements in the data that are generated by ￿ uctuations
in the monetary aggregates. So in theory, provided that we allow for a su¢ ciently large number of
latent factors, the composition of the panel should not matter for the estimation of latent factors.
Looking across countries reveals that the correlation with the common factors is broadly similar
across countries in each of the subsamples. Table 2 reports the average R2 statistic for each country,
across the variables listed in the previous table. It shows that country-level R2 vary between 0.64
and 0.77 for the entire sample, between 0.74 and 0.84 in the ￿rst subsample, and between 0.78 and
0.87 in the post-EMU sample.
Table 2 also shows that in the case of Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, the R2 are
sensibly lower for the entire sample than for each of the subsamples considered. This suggests that
the relationship between the variables in those countries and the common factors must have changed
between the pre-99 and post-99 period. Finally, we observe that Italian and Spanish variables have
become somewhat less tied to EA-wide developments over time. This comes essentially from the
growth rates of real variables. This is particularly clear for Spain, as its GDP has grown at a faster
pace than the rest of the EA since 1995, but is less clear-cut for Italy which has grown slightly less
rapidly than the rest of the EA.
154 Monetary Policy Regimes and the Monetary Transmission Mech-
anism
In the last section, we have documented that the variables of each individual country have been on
average fairly highly correlated with the EA-wide common factors. Nonetheless, aggregate shocks
a⁄ecting the entire EA may have di⁄erent implications on each individual country. To assess
this, we use our estimated FAVAR to characterize the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks, which we
measure here as an unanticipated increase in the EA short-term interest rate of 100 basis points
(bp), on the national economies considered. Our empirical model is well suited for this as it allows
us to determine simultaneously the e⁄ects of such shocks on all country-level variables.
As mentioned above, the data reveal changes over time in the degree of comovement of key
European variables with EA-wide common factors. A natural implication of such changes is that the
transmission of monetary policy may have evolved over time. We thus report the e⁄ects of monetary
policy shocks both for our benchmark sample and for the post-EMU period. The description of the
e⁄ects of this shock is a natural starting point in a context where several countries have chosen to
adopt a common currency and therefore to submit their economy to a single monetary policy.
4.1 Identi￿cation
To identify monetary policy shocks, we proceed similarly to Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) by
assuming in the spirit of VAR analyses, that the latent factors Ft and the oil price in￿ ation ￿oil
t
cannot respond contemporaneously to a surprise interest-rate change, while the short-term rate
Rt can respond to any innovation in the factors Ft or in oil prices. Of course, we don￿ t restrict
in any way the response of factors Ft and ￿oil
t in the periods following the monetary shock. This
constitutes a minimal set of restrictions needed to identify monetary policy shocks. We also impose
that all prices and quantity series respond to monetary policy only through its lagged e⁄ect on Ft
(and potentially ￿oil
t ). This guarantees that none of these variables responds contemporaneously
to unexpected monetary shocks, as is often assumed. These restrictions do however not prevent
any of the ￿nancial variables such as bond yields, stock prices and exchange rates from responding
contemporaneously to the short-term interest rate.
16In the next section, we present a theoretical model that is designed provide some explanations
for the monetary transmission mechanism. We note at this point that this model is consistent with
the identifying assumptions made here. In particular, both the theoretical model and the FAVAR
have the property that output, consumption, and in￿ ation do not respond contemporaneously to
monetary shocks.
Our assumption that the monetary policy instrument is the short-term EA interest-rate is
certainly appropriate for the post-EMU period during which the ECB has set the short-term EA
interest rate. It may be less appropriate however for the pre-EMU period, during which each
national central bank could in principle choose its own interest rate. As in Peersman and Smets
(2003), Smets and Wouters (2003) and many others, during the pre-EMU period, our monetary
policy shock is a ￿ctitious shock that we estimate would have been generated by the ECB, had it
existed.
In the pre-EMU period, the German central bank, i.e., the Bundesbank, assumed a central
role in setting the level of interest rates for all countries participating to the European Monetary
System. Given the Exchange Rate Mechanism in place, which limited ￿ uctuations in nominal
exchange rates, most of the other national central banks had to respond to changes in interest rates
by the Bundesbank. For this reason, we veri￿ed the robustness of our results for the pre-EMU
period by identifying a monetary policy shock as a surprise increase in the German short-term
interest rate. The results obtained are brie￿ y described in section 4.5 that discusses the robustness
of our results, and are reported in Appendix B.
4.2 E⁄ects of monetary policy shocks in the Euro Area in the 1988-2007 period
Figures 1a￿ 1c report the estimated impulse responses to an unexpected 100 basis-point increase in
the EA short-term interest rate. While the dark solid lines plot the responses of the variables in
each country for the full sample of 1988-2007 along with the 90% con￿dence intervals (dotted lines),
the dashed lines plot the responses for the post-EMU period starting in 1999. The ￿gures plot in
column the responses of a particular variable. The ￿rst ￿ve plots in each column show the impulse
responses in the euro area, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. The bottom two plots combine the
responses for all countries in the two di⁄erent samples. They reveal the di⁄erences across regions
17in each sample.
We ￿rst start by describing the response of the EA economy in the 1988-2007 period, by focusing
on the plots in the ￿rst row. These plots show that faced with an unanticipated monetary tightening
of 100 bp, bond yields overall increase on impact by even more than 100 bp, the EA real exchange
rate appreciates by about 2% in the quarter of the shock and is expected to continue appreciating
for more than 2 years, and the growth rate of the monetary aggregate M3 fall. The real GDP yoy
growth rate falls by about 1% after a year and a half and does not revert to positive value before
three years. Our point estimate of the impact of monetary policy on output tends to be larger than
in Smets and Wouters (2003) and various estimates reported in Angeloni et al. (2003). The large
drop in output re￿ ects a broad-based decline in aggregate consumption, investment, and exports.16
The decline in overall economic activity is furthermore clearly re￿ ected in a fall in employment
reaching about 0.7% after 6 quarters and a subsequent increase in the unemployment rate. It is
followed by a reduction in hourly earnings and in CPI in￿ ation.
4.3 Cross-country di⁄erences in the 1988-2007 period
The transmission of monetary policy disturbances on the EA just described hides however hetero-
geneity across the countries￿responses. Looking at the other panels, we observe in Figure 1a that a
surprise increase in the EA short-term interest rate results in much larger interest-rate increases in
countries such as Italy and Spain than in the other countries.17 This heterogeneity gets ampli￿ed
when looking at long-term yields. In fact, the Italian and Spanish bond yields rise almost twice as
much as the yields of some other countries such as Germany, France or the Netherlands.
Consistent with the larger rise in bond yields in Italy and Spain over the whole sample and with
the interest-rate parity condition, the Italian and Spanish currencies depreciate with respect to the
other countries￿ s currencies in pre-EMU period. The Italian and Spanish real e⁄ective exchange
rates depreciate on impact and in subsequent quarters, while the price levels remain unchanged
16Among the reponses not reported in the ￿gures, the growth rate of M1 also falls and the stock market drops by
10% on impact. Public consumption however remains unchanged for about a year and starts falling only after that.
17The responses of the variables in Belgium and the Netherlands (not reported) are very similar to those of the
EA and countries such as Germany and France, but di⁄erent from the responses in Italy and Spain. The responses
of Belgium and the Netherlands are available from the authors upon request.
18in the period of the shock (Figures 1a and 1c).18 Instead, all of the other countries see their real
exchange rates appreciate on impact and for several quarters after the shock, in response to the
monetary tightening.
Following the increase in interest rates and the movements of the exchange rate, we observe a
decline in the growth rate of GDP. While the GDP responses appear rather homogenous across
countries, the responses of GDP components are not. Importantly, consumption falls by about
twice as much in Italy and Spain than in the other countries, and investment also falls more. The
depreciation of the Italian and Spanish real exchange rates however mitigates the fall in exports thus
contributing to a more homogenous output response. These ￿gures thus clearly reveal how diverse
responses of bond yields and exchange rates a⁄ect di⁄erently the various European economies,
when we consider economic adjustments in the pre-EMU period.
We note that the responses of CPI in￿ ation reveal a temporary ￿price puzzle￿ in Germany
and Italy, following a tightening of the arti￿cial EA interest rate. While the price increases may be
explained in Italy by the exchange rate depreciation ￿ a feature that the model we present below is
able to replicate ￿ the price increase in Germany is more di¢ cult to rationalize. One possibility is
that the arti￿cial EA interest rate may not properly capture surprise monetary shocks for Germany.
In fact, when we identify monetary shocks as surprise increases in the German interest rate, for the
sample starting in 1988, we obtain almost no price puzzle for Germany (see ￿gures Appendix B).
It is reassuring, however, that all other responses appear to be very similar to the ones reported in
our benchmark speci￿cation, in Figures 1a-1c.
Finally, it should be stressed that the e⁄ects of interest rate shocks on M3 (as well as on M1)
are quite di⁄erent across countries. We have seen in section 3.5 that the monetary aggregates are
markedly more loosely related to the common factors than most other variables under consideration.
This may re￿ ect the pervasive di⁄erences in the national habits and in the availability of savings
instruments across countries of the EA. The ECB (2007) report on ￿nancial integration points
to, inter alia, the large di⁄erences in ￿nancial assets of household sectors across countries (from
four times annual consumption in Belgium and Italy to only twice in France and Germany), large
18Recall that the variables in the FAVAR are expressed in yoy growth rates. The impulse response functions of yoy
growth rates and (log) levels are identical for the ￿rst 4 quarters following the shock.
19di⁄erences in the composition of ￿nancial wealth, and di⁄erent pass-through of the market interest
rate to deposit interest rates (see Kok Słrensen and Werner, 2006, and references therein).
As we noted, the responses that we have documented reveal much larger increases in interest
rates and sharper drops in consumption in Italy and Spain than in the other EA countries. Italy,
for instance, has however been subject to considerable speculative attacks in the early 1990s. That
forced the Bank of Italy to increase short-term rates considerably more than, e.g., in Germany,
in order to defend its currency ￿ thereby leading to a more important contraction of economic
activity ￿ until it had to abandon the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in September 1992. One
might thus wonder whether the e⁄ects that we uncovered are due to this unusual event that was
the crisis of the ERM. To investigate this question, we re-estimated the impulse response functions
for the entire sample, except that we excluded the observations from the third quarter of 1992 to
the second quarter of 1993. We ￿nd that the responses of short- and long-term interest rates are
almost identical to the one reported in Figures 1a. The only notable di⁄erence is that the response
of consumption is slightly smaller in all countries, but we still observe a much larger contraction
of consumption in Italy and Spain than in the other EA countries. So the facts that we have
documented do not appear to be simply an artifact of a few observations around the ERM crisis.
4.4 Has the transmission changed with the EMU?
To determine whether the monetary transmission has changed since the start of the EMU, we re-
estimate the e⁄ects of a monetary policy shock using the 37 quarterly observations that correspond
to the post-1999 period corresponding to the EMU. The scarcity of degrees of freedom implies
that we should be extremely cautious in interpreting the results. We nevertheless trust that the
estimates provide an indication on the direction of evolution of the e⁄ects of monetary policy with
respect to the full sample estimates.
Several results are worth underlying for the post-99 period, again in the face of a 100 bp increase
in the short-term interest rate. First, the short-term interest rate responses are indistinguishable
for all countries, given that they refer to the same currency. Second, the rise in bond yields in the
EMU period is almost half of the one estimated for the entire sample, and the large di⁄erences
across countries that were observable prior to the EMU vanish entirely. The EA e⁄ective exchange
20rate appreciates considerably more than it did over the full sample. One reason for this is that real
exchange rates uniformly appreciate in EA countries, including in Italy and in Spain.19
Given the relatively small change in bond yields, measures of economic activity such as real
GDP, consumption, investment fall much less, if at all in the EMU period. As a result, employment
falls much less, and the unemployment rate￿ s increase is sensibly smaller.
Altogether, it appears that a major characteristic of the new monetary policy regime is the lack
of response of long-term interest rates to surprise increases in the short-term interest rate.20 We
illustrate this evolution by comparing in Figure 2 the response of the long-term interest rate (dashed
lines) to the response an arti￿cial long-term interest rate excluding a term premium (crosses). The
latter obtained by appealing to the expectations hypothesis and computed as the average response
of the short-term interest rate over the subsequent 28 quarters, i.e. a theoretical bond of 7-year
maturity. A striking di⁄erence between the full sample and the post-1999 regime is that, since the
launch of the euro, the response of long-term interest rates displays a smaller term premium (i.e., a
smaller di⁄erence between the market long-term rate and the arti￿cial rate). The responses of these
interest rates are represented in the lower right plot of Figure 2 for the EA, but they are almost
identical for all individual countries in the post-1999 period. Moreover, over the entire sample, the
term premium gap is the largest in Italy and in Spain, which suggests that prior to the launch of the
euro, the premium for the risk of devaluation or depreciation of the peseta and the lira increased
markedly following a tightening of the monetary policy stance in the euro area.
While most measures of economic activity appear to fall less in the EMU period, presumably
in part because of smaller bond yield responses, much of the remaining output adjustment appears
to be driven by international trade. This may be an important feature of the new monetary policy
regime characterized by more stable long-term interest rates and a sharper responses of the EA-wide
real exchange rate to monetary policy shocks.
Finally, the responses of several variables (some not reported) remain heterogenous across coun-
19The real exchange rate response is larger for the EA than for each of the individual countries as much of the
trade of the individual countries is with other European economies, whereas the EA real exchange rate measures
appreciations and depreciations solely relative to countries outside of the EA.
20This result is consistent with the ones of Ehrmann et al. (2007) who use daily interest rates to compare the
responses of French, German, Italian and Spanish long-term yields to news in France, Germany, Italy and Spain
before and after 1999.
21tries, in the EMU period. To name a few, the responses of M1 are twice as negative in Spain and
Belgium than in France, Germany and Italy. M3 increases in all countries, though to a di⁄erent
extent. Relatively larger responses of German exports and investment carry through to a larger
GDP response than in other EA countries. Public consumption responses range from positive in
Belgium and Italy ￿ the two countries with the largest stock of government debt ￿ to sharply
negative in the Netherlands. We also note some di⁄erences in labor market dynamics, aspects
analyzed in depth in McCallum and Smets (2007).
4.5 Robustness
In view of the small number of degrees of freedom we have available to estimate the above set of
results, we have conducted a series of robustness checks with respect to the econometric speci￿cation
of the FAVAR. In particular, we estimated the above impulse response functions with models that
admit additional lags, additional latent factors, quarter-on-quarter growth rates, and considering
shocks to the German interest rate instead of the EA average interest rate.
Most of the results described above are robust. In particular the larger response of the Italian
and Spanish interest rates and of their consumption are common outcomes of all these alternative
speci￿cations when estimated over the full sample. Interestingly, Italy and Spain also stand out
in response to an unexpected oil-price increase, with Italian and Spanish bonds yields increasing
more that in the other countries of the EA, and consumption falling more (see Appendix C). This
provides further evidence that bond markets and credibility issues may contribute to the di⁄erent
responses of European economies to various shocks prior to the EMU.
In all speci￿cations considered, we observe a smaller response of consumption after 1999 than
in the full-sample estimates, following a monetary tightening. However, the speci￿cation with
quarter-on-quarter growth rates and several lags shows that, due to a large response of exports,
GDP declines as much in the post-1999 period as in the full sample. These impulse responses
functions are however much less precisely estimated than in our benchmark speci￿cation.
In the case in which the monetary policy shock is de￿ned in terms of the German short-term
interest rate, nearly all the results reported in Figure 1 carry through. As mentioned above, however,
the price puzzle for German CPI is very much attenuated. This re￿ ects that the identi￿cation of
22area-wide monetary shocks in the period prior to the euro is di¢ cult. However, except for the
response of German prices, nearly all other impulse responses are strikingly similar for a German
or an area-wide monetary policy shock.
5 Explaining the Evolution of the Transmission Mechanism: The
Role of Monetary Regimes and Interest-Rate Parity
As discussed in the previous section, the empirical characterization of the transmission of monetary
policy in the EA displays a rich picture. In the pre-EMU period, interest-rate surprises in Germany
or in the EA as a whole are found to cause larger responses of short-term rates in Italy and Spain,
relatively large increase in long-term bond yields, depreciations of the Italian and Spanish currencies
(both in nominal and real terms), a sharp contraction in consumption and investment in these
countries. Such reductions in activity are o⁄set by a relatively strong improvement in net exports,
thereby resulting in a moderate contraction of real GDP. In the EMU period, however, a similar
increase in the EA interest rate results in a much more homogenous response of individual EA
countries, and a quantitatively smaller reduction in economic activity measures.
While the European economy has changed in many dimensions since the monetary union, we
now attempt to determine to what extent the monetary regime in place can explain both the
di⁄erences in the transmission of monetary policy across countries and over time. To do so, we
use an open-economy DSGE monetary model along the lines of Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002, 2005),
Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (2002), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Altissimo et al. (2004), Benigno
and Benigno (2006), and Ferrero, Gertler and Svensson (2007) (henceforth FGS) and others.21
The speci￿c variant considered here builds on FGS. This framework, while stylized, is su¢ ciently
rich to generate a nontrivial e⁄ect of monetary policy variables such as output, consumption, net
exports, and in￿ ation measures. It also allows for di⁄erent consumption responses across regions,
and a switching of expenditures in consumption and net exports in response to real exchange rates
movements.
We proceed by presenting the model. The model is explained in details in FGS, so we merely
21For a larger-scale model, see, e.g., Faruquee, Laxton, Muir, and Pesenti (2007).
23summarize it here, emphasizing the changes relative to FGS. We next discuss the calibration of the
model parameters, including those characterizing monetary policy. Finally, we analyze the model￿ s
implications, attempting to provide an explanation for the stylized facts just described.
5.1 A stylized two-country model
The model involves two large countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), of equal size. Each country is
populated by a representative household that consumes tradable and nontradable goods and that
contains a continuum of workers who supply labor to intermediate-goods ￿rms. Each of these ￿rms
hires one worker and produces either tradable or non-tradable goods which it sells on a monopolisti-
cally competitive market. These ￿rms optimally reset their prices at random time intervals. In each
sector, we also have competitive ￿nal-goods ￿rms which combine the di⁄erentiated intermediate
goods into a homogenous consumption good. In addition, to ￿t the evidence on imperfect pass-
through (e.g., Campa and Goldberg, 2006), we assume as in Monacelli (2005) that monopolistically
competitive importers of foreign tradable goods resell them to residents at prices set in domestic
currency in a staggered fashion.22 In order to account for di⁄erent consumption behavior across
countries, we assume incomplete ￿nancial markets across countries (even though the household
provides perfect insurance within each country), by assuming that a single bond is traded inter-
nationally. As in FGS, one simpli￿cation is that we treat as nondurable consumption all domestic
interest-rate sensitive expenditures, including what is commonly labeled as investment. However,
as mentioned in Woodford (2003, chap. 5), to the extent that we are not interested in distinguish-
ing consumption and investment, this should not a⁄ect importantly the model￿ s predictions for the
other variables.23
We will consider two monetary regimes. The pre-EMU regime is characterized by distinct
central banks in each country, each setting short-term interest rates according to a generalized
22Corsetti and Dedola (2005) propose an alternative model of limited pass-through in which distributing imported
goods requires nontradables.
23In fact, macroeconomic models that successfully explain the behavior of investment often assume adjustment
costs in investment (e.g., Basu and Kimball, 2003; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005). As shown in Woodford
(2003), such adjustment costs yield a log-linearized Euler equation for investment that is very similar to the one for
consumption in the presence of internal habit formation. It follows that the intertemporal allocation of aggregate
expenditures can be approximated by a similar Euler equation, in which the degree of habit formation also serves as
a proxy for investment adjustment costs. Nonetheless, in treating investment similarly to non-durable expenditures,
we do abstract from the e⁄ects of investment on future production capacities.
24Taylor rule which may include responses to exchange-rate ￿ uctuations. Area-wide variables are
obtained by aggregating the relevant variables across the two countries. In the post-EMU regime,
instead, a supra-national authority ￿ the European Central Bank ￿ is assumed to set an EA wide
interest rate, according to a generalized Taylor rule involving area-wide variables.
In order for the model to be consistent with the identifying assumptions made in our empirical
FAVAR to identify the monetary policy shocks, we assume in contrast to FGS but similarly to
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) that the households￿
aggregate consumption decisions and all ￿rms￿pricing decisions are made prior to the realization
of exogenous shocks, so that prices and consumption respond do not respond contemporaneously
to the monetary shock. In addition, we allow households to form habit in consumption, and the
￿rms who don￿ t reoptimize their prices to index them to past in￿ ation. Such deviations from FGS
allow the model to generate responses of consumption and in￿ ation to shocks that are more in line
with the FAVAR estimates.
As a last departure from FGS, we allow for a wedge in the uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP) condition. This wedge, assumed to be exogenous here, is meant to capture deviations from
the UIP, argued by Devereux and Engel (2002) to be needed in order to explain the disconnect
between ￿ uctuations in exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables. Empirical evidence
for such deviations from UIP have also often been reported in the empirical literature, whether
unconditionally (e.g., Bekaert and Hodrick, 1993; Engel, 1996; Froot and Thaler, 1990; Mark and
Wu, 1998; Rossi, 2007), or conditionally on monetary policy shocks (Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995;
Scholl and Uhlig, 2006). While Bekaert, Wei, and Xing (2007) ￿nd smaller departures from the
UIP than reported previously, when adjusting for small sample bias, they ￿nd evidence of a time-
varying risk premium displaying a highly persistent component in expected exchange rate changes.
As discussed below, such a wedge will prove to be important in explaining the di⁄erential responses
of consumption and investment across countries, in the pre-EMU period.
We now describe the environment, following closely FGS.
255.1.1 Households


























where Et￿1 is the expectation operator, conditional on the information up to the end of period t￿1;
Ct denotes aggregate consumption, ! 2 (0;1] is the degree of internal habit persistence, ￿￿1 > 0
would correspond to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the absence of habit formation,
’ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, Lkt (f) represents hours worked by worker
f 2 [0;1] in an intermediate-goods ￿rm, in sector k; i.e., either the home tradable sector H (with
measure ￿) or the domestic nontradable sector N (with measure 1 ￿ ￿). As in FGS, the discount
factor ￿t evolves according to ￿t = ￿t￿t￿1; and ￿t ￿ e￿t=
￿
1 +  
￿
log ￿ Ct ￿ ￿ #
￿￿
where ￿ Ct corresponds
to the household￿ s consumption level but is treated by the household as exogenous, and where ￿t
is a preference shock.24








￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
with ￿ 2 [0;1] representing the share of tradable goods. The consumption of tradable goods















The coe¢ cient ￿ 2 (0:5;1] denotes home bias in tradables, and ￿ is the elasticity of substitution
among domestically produced and imported tradables. The home consumer price index (CPI)
24This formulation of the discount factor incorporates ￿ in the case that the representative household stands for a
continuum of households ￿ the stimulative e⁄ect on individual consumption of an increase in average consumption,
as in Uzawa (1968). However, as emphasized in FGS, the parameter   is calibrated to such a small value that this
e⁄ect is negligible. It merely serves as a technical device to guarantee a unique steady state in the case of incomplete
￿nancial markets across countries. One can alternatively obtain a such a unique steady state by assuming a constant
discount factor ￿, but introducing a debt-elastic interest rate premium in the budget constraints (7) and (10) below,
as in Benigno (2001), Kollmann (2002), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), and Justiniano and Preston (2006).














1￿￿ : In the foreign country,
we assume symmetric preferences, consumption aggregates, and price indices which we denote by
starred (*) variables and coe¢ cients.25
Optimal behavior on the part of each household requires ￿rst an optimal allocation of consump-
tion spending across di⁄erentiated goods. While we assume that households choose their level of
total consumption on the basis of information available at date t ￿ 1; we let them choose the allo-
cation of their consumption basket after the contemporaneous shocks have realized. The optimal
allocation of (domestically- and foreign-produced) tradables goods as well as nontradable goods























As in FGS, we assume that there is a single internationally traded one-period bond. We denote
by Bt the nominal holdings at the beginning of period t + 1; denominated in units of the home
currency. The household￿ s budget constraint in the home country is then given by
PtCt + Bt = It￿1Bt￿1 +
Z ￿
0
WHt (f)LHt (f)df +
Z 1
￿
WNt (f)LNt (f)df + ￿t (7)
where It￿1 is the gross nominal interest rate in domestic currency between period t￿1 and t; Wkt (f)
is the nominal wage obtained by worker f in sector k; and ￿t combines aggregate dividends, lump
sum taxes and transfers. Maximizing the utility function (4) subject to (7) yields the following
25One notable di⁄erence with respect to the home economy is that the foreign household consumption of tradable


















27optimal choice of expenditures
Et￿1 f￿tPtg = Et￿1
￿
(Ct ￿ !Ct￿1)
￿￿ ￿ !￿t (Ct+1 ￿ !Ct)
￿￿￿
(8)
where ￿t is the household￿ s marginal utility of additional nominal income at date t: This expression
makes clear that the plan for aggregate consumption at date t is made on the basis of information








Furthermore, the optimal choice of labor supply equalizes the real wage with the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure.
The representative household in the foreign country is very similar. One di⁄erence, however,
between the two countries is that the foreign bond is not traded internationally. The foreign

























where the labor income indicates that foreign workers and ￿rms operate in either the foreign
tradable sector or the nontradable sector, D￿
t represents the foreign household￿ s holdings of the
foreign debt while B￿
t denotes the foreign household￿ s holdings of the domestic bond, issued in the
home currency, and Et is the nominal exchange rate, i.e., the amount of home currency needed in
exchange for a unit of foreign currency. In contrast to FGS, but as in McCallum and Nelson (2000)
or Justiniano and Preston (2006) we introduce an exogenous term e￿t￿1 which can be interpreted
as a risk premium shock, or a bias in the foreign household￿ s expectation of the period-t revenue
from holding home bonds. This shock can alternatively be interpreted as a bias in the foreign
household￿ s date t ￿ 1 forecast of the date t exchange rate, Et; as in Kollmann (2002).
The foreign household choice of consumption plans is also characterized by optimal conditions
of the form (8) and (9). In addition, given that foreign citizen may hold bonds of both countries,
they must be indi⁄erent between holding home and foreign bonds. This results in the following
























We have three types of ￿rms: ￿nal-goods ￿rms, intermediate-goods ￿rms, and importing retailers.
Final-goods ￿rms. In each sector H and N; ￿nal goods ￿rms, which are acting on a competitive
























where ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. Cost minimization for the
￿nal-goods ￿rms implies the following demand functions for intermediate-goods producing ￿rms












where the price indices PHt and PNt aggregate underlying prices Pkt (f):
Each intermediate ￿rm f in sector k = H;N produces output Ykt (f) by hiring labor Lkt (f)
and using the production function
Ykt (f) = AtLkt (f)
where the total factor productivity term At = Zteat; and Zt=Zt￿1 = 1 + g describes trend produc-
tivity, while eat denotes temporary ￿ uctuations in total factor productivity. As the ￿rm competes
to attract labor, its nominal marginal cost is MCkt (f) = Wkt (f)=At:
Intermediate ￿rms. Intermediate ￿rms are assumed to set prices on a staggered manner. A
fraction 1￿￿ of ￿rms (chosen independently of the history of price changes) can choose a new price
in each period. Our informational assumptions imply that the ￿rms that get to reset their prices
must do so using information available at period t￿1: In addition, we assume that if a price is not
29re-optimized, it is indexed to lagged in￿ ation in sector k = H;N according to the rule






for some ￿ 2 [0;1]: Given that the problem is the same for all ￿rms of sector k which reset their


















subject to the demand for their good (12). In the previous expression, ￿t;t+s = ￿t;t+s￿t+s=￿t is the
stochastic discount factor between periods t and t + s; ￿t;t+s = ￿s￿1
j=0￿t+j; for s ￿ 1; and ￿t;t = 1:
















Importing retailers. To model the imperfect pass-through found in the data, we assume that
monopolistically competitive retailers import foreign tradables goods and sell them to domestic
consumers, as in Monacelli (2005). These retailers also set their prices in a staggered fashion so
that the law of one price does not hold at the consumer level. As for the intermediate ￿rms, a
fraction 1 ￿ ~ ￿ of retailers choose a new price in each period, on the basis of information available
at period t￿1: Again, if a price is not re-optimized, it is indexed to lagged in￿ ation in that sector,
according to the rule (13). Since the problem is identical for retailers which reset their price at
date t; they all choose an optimal price Po




















subject to the demand for the imported good (6). In the above expression, P￿
F;t denotes the price of




1 ￿ ~ ￿
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(Po







We consider two distinct monetary regimes, one referring to the pre-EMU period in which each
national central banks sets its own interest rate according to a generalized forward-looking Taylor
rule, and one referring to the monetary union, in which a supra-national central bank sets common
short-term interest rates.
More speci￿cally, in the pre-EMU regime, we assume that the home national central banks sets
its short-term riskless interest rate according to
it = ￿it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




where it ￿ log(It=I) corresponds to the deviations of the interest rate from its steady-state value,
￿ ￿t ￿ log(Pt=Pt￿4) denotes deviations of year-over-year CPI in￿ ation around the steady state (as-
sumed to be zero), yt represents percent deviations of output from trend, ￿et = log(Et=Et￿1)
denotes percent nominal depreciation of the home currency, and the iid shock "t measures unex-
pected interest-rate disturbances. The foreign central bank follows a similar rule
i￿
t = ￿￿i￿












where, again, the stars refer to foreign variables or coe¢ cients. Note that we allow for cross-country
interactions as the national central banks may respond to ￿ uctuations in the exchange rate or to
the other country￿ s interest rate. Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1998) and Angeloni and Dedola (1999)
argue that such rules provide a good characterization of monetary policy in a number of countries,
including Germany and Italy, before the monetary union.
In the EMU regime, a single common short-term rate prevails, so that it = i￿
t = iea
t where ea
stands for Euro-area variables, and ￿et = 0 in all periods. We assume that the common central
31bank ￿ corresponding to the ECB ￿ sets interest rate according to the interest-rate rule
iea
t = ￿eaiea










where area-wide in￿ ation and output are de￿ned as ￿ ￿ea
t = (￿ ￿t + ￿ ￿￿
t)=2; yea
t = (yt + y￿
t)=2:
5.1.4 Equilibrium characterization
To close the model, we use equilibrium conditions stating that supply of tradables and nontradable
goods must be equal to the respective demands in each country, and that international ￿nancial
markets clear. To characterize the response of various variables to monetary shocks, we solve
a log-linear approximation to the model￿ s equilibrium conditions around a deterministic state,
using standard techniques. We thus implicitly assume that the shocks are small enough for the
approximation to be valid. In the steady state, both economies are symmetric, the trade balance
and foreign debt are equal to zero, output in each sector grows at the constant trend productivity





are equal to 1, in￿ ation is equal to zero, and the real interest rate is equal to (1 + g)=￿; where ￿
the steady-state value of ￿t:
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are described in Appendix D.
5.2 Model calibration
We calibrate the model￿ s parameters in order to provide its quantitative predictions, and to deter-
mine whether we can replicate at least some of the stylized facts mentioned above. In particular we
focus our attention on changes in responses of key macroeconomic variables between the pre-EMU
and EMU period. We also focus on the di⁄erence in responses across countries in the pre-EMU
period, especially the di⁄erences between Italy and Spain on the one hand, and Germany along
with other EA countries on the other hand. We assume that Home (H), stands for Italy or Spain,
and Foreign (F) stands for Germany along with the other EA countries.
32We calibrate the structural parameters describing the behavior of the private sector similarly
to earlier studies such as FGS or Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2005), and use estimated coe¢ cients for the
policy rules. While the calibration of the structural parameters sacri￿ces somewhat the model￿ s
ability to replicate the empirical responses, we did check that the model￿ s predictions are not too
sensitive the chosen parameter values. However, as we will see below, coe¢ cients of the policy rules
do play an important role on the shape of the responses to various shocks.
5.2.1 Structural parameters
As mentioned, most structural parameters are taken from FGS and are roughly in line with values
chosen in other studies (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 2005) and with some microeconomic data. We
set the same values for both countries. The steady-state growth rate of the economy g is set
to 0.5%, so that annual growth is 2%. The steady-state discount factor ￿ is set to 0.99. The
parameters describing the evolution of the discount factor # = ￿1000 and   = 7:2361 ￿ 10￿6 are
chosen so that ￿ uctuations in ￿t have no noticeable implications on the economy dynamics.26 The
Frisch elasticity of labor supply is ’￿1 = 0:5: The elasticity of substitution among intermediate
goods ￿ = 11 results in a steady-state markup of 10% in the tradable and nontradable sectors.
We set the probability that intermediate-goods ￿rms and importing retailers do not re-optimize
their price to ￿ = ~ ￿ = 0:66; corresponding to a mean duration between price re-optimizations of 3
quarters. Smets and Wouters (2002) ￿nd evidence that import prices display a similar degree of
price stickiness as domestic prices on the basis of estimated responses to monetary shocks in the
EA. For the parameters that determine the openness of the economies, we set the share of tradables
in the consumption basket ￿ to 0:25; the preference share for home tradables ￿ = 0:7 (it would
be 0.5 in the absence of home bias), and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
tradables is ￿ = 2; as in FGS.
FGS assume a log utility function of consumption, and no habit persistence or in￿ ation in-
dexing. This yields however sharp responses in in￿ ation and consumption to monetary shocks, in
contrast to the empirical evidence. To generate more realistic hump-shaped responses of consump-
26As mentioned above, the assumption of a variable discount factor is merely a technical device yielding a unique
steady state.
33tion expenditures and output of the model economy we assume some degree of habit persistence
!.27 We calibrate this parameter at 0.59 which corresponds to the (median) estimate obtained by
Smets and Wouters (2003), in their model of the EA. We similarly use the estimates of Smets and
Wouters (2003) to calibrate the curvature of the utility of consumption and the degree of in￿ ation
indexing to respectively ￿ = 1:37 and ￿ = ~ ￿ = 0:47:
5.2.2 Policy rule coe¢ cients
We calibrate the policy rule coe¢ cients for the home and foreign country, in the pre-EMU period
using estimates of Angeloni and Dedola (1999, Table 9b). These authors estimate interest rate
rules of the form (14)-(15) jointly for Italy and Germany, for the period 1988-1997, which covers
nearly entirely our pre-EMU sample. Their preferred speci￿cation involves horizons on in￿ ation
expectations of h = h￿ = 0; so that the central banks set interest rates in response to in￿ ation that
has occurred over the past year. As the estimates are obtained using monthly data, we convert
them for application to quarterly data.28 We thus have ￿ = 0:79; ￿￿ = 1:22; ￿y = 0:30; ￿i = 0:41
for Italy,29 and ￿￿ = 0:82; ￿￿
￿ = 1:41; ￿￿
y = 0:30; ￿￿
i = 0 for Germany. Angeloni and Dedola (1999)
do not include a bilateral DM/Lira exchange rate in their policy rules, but they include the $/DM
exchange rate. Since we abstract form the world outside of the EA in the model, we assume that
German monetary policy does not respond to the exchange rate (￿￿
e = 0), while the annualized
Italian interest rate responds with a short-run coe¢ cient of 0.4 to the exchange rate depreciation.
This is meant to capture the fact that the Italian central bank was required to maintain its exchange
rate within narrow bands, as long as it took part in the exchange rate mechanism. This results in
a long-run coe¢ cient ￿e = 5:
For the post-EMU period, we estimate an interest-rate rule of the form (16) on EA data, using
GMM, similarly to Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1998). We use as instruments: the current value of
27The degree of habit persistence also proxies for investment adjustment costs in the case that consumption ex-
penditures include also investment expenditures.
28For the conversion, we assume that monthly values of (annualized) short term interest rates are constant in
a given quarter, and equal to the corresponding (annualized) quarterly rate. In that case, the coe¢ cient on the
quarterly lagged interest rate is ￿ = ￿m=(3 ￿ 2￿m) where ￿m is the policy coe¢ cient on the monthly lagged interest
rate. The long-run coe¢ cients on in￿ ation, output, and the foreign interest rate remain unchanged at the quarterly
frequency.
29Angeloni and Dedola (1999)￿ s estimated policy rule for Spain is similar to that estimated for Italy.
34in￿ ation and detrended output as well as three latent factors extracted from the EA indicators.
Our preferred horizon is h = 2: As the estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate is relatively
high, ￿ea = 0:93; the implied long-run responses to expected in￿ ation and output ￿ uctuations are
also quite strong: ￿ea
￿ = 13:03 and ￿ea
y = 8:01:30 Nonetheless, we verify that our conclusions remain
robust to smaller values of these coe¢ cients.
5.2.3 Wedge in uncovered interest-rate parity
The remaining parameters that we need to calibrate refer to the process describing the wedge in
the uncovered interest-rate parity, ￿t: The UIP condition (11) can be log-linearized to yield
it ￿ i￿
t = Et￿et+1 + ￿t: (17)
We assume that ￿t follows an AR(1) process which is allowed to respond to monetary shocks
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + ￿"￿
t + "￿t
where "￿
t are foreign monetary policy shocks and "￿t denotes other possible shocks to that wedge.
By allowing ￿t to respond to monetary shocks, we hope to capture in an arguably reduced form
the e⁄ect of monetary shocks on the risk premium emphasized by Scholl and Uhlig (2006). We
assume that this wedge is very persistent, setting ￿￿ = 0:98; and will consider di⁄erent values of
the parameter ￿:
5.3 Model￿ s quantitative predictions: Explaining the changes in the monetary
transmission mechanism
Having calibrated the model, we can now determine whether it can replicate the stylized facts
mentioned above, namely the cross-country di⁄erences in responses as well as their changes with
the introduction of the euro that we report in Figures 1a￿ 1c.
30While this representation of the policy rule appears very aggressive, it is important to realize that this is due to
the large coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate. The policy rule may equivalently be written in terms of changes of
the interest rate: ￿i
ea
t = 0:91 Et￿ ￿
ea







355.3.1 Pre-EMU cross-country di⁄erences
Figures 3a-3d indicate the responses of key variables to an unexpected interest-rate increase of 100
bp in the foreign economy ￿ which stands for Germany ￿ in the case that both economies set
their interest-rates according to the estimated policy rules (14) and (15). This is meant to replicate
the e⁄ects of a monetary policy tightening in the pre-EMU period, reported in Figures 1a-1c.
Figure 3a shows the responses of the home economy (i.e., Italy or Spain, solid lines) and the
foreign economy (i.e., Germany, dashed lines) in the absence of a wedge in the UIP condition (￿ = 0;
so ￿t = 0). The unexpected increase in the foreign short-term rate is associated with a rise in the
long-term rate, a drop in output, consumption, and in￿ ation. As the domestic currency depreciates
more than prices adjust, the domestic real exchange rate (qt) also depreciates, and home terms of
trade (TOT, measuring foreign prices relative to domestic prices, in domestic currency) increase.
This stimulates an increase in net exports of home goods. Note that investors in the internationally
traded security do not require as large an increase in the home interest rate as that observed for
the foreign interest rate. The reason is that the domestic currency is expected to have depreciated
beyond its long term value, so that it is expected to appreciate slightly in subsequent periods.
The response of home interest rates just described is however at odds with the interest-rate
responses that we had documented for countries such as Spain and Italy in Figure 1a. In fact, in
pre-EMU data, these short and long-term rates increased signi￿cantly more than those estimated for
Germany and other countries. They were also associated with sharp contractions in consumption
and employment in those countries. Instead, the model-based responses display a milder response of
the home variables. One might think that by letting the home country￿ s central bank respond more
to exchange rate ￿ uctuations (i.e., a larger ￿e), we may generate stronger responses of interest
rates and consumption at home. However, even for very large values of ￿e; we cannot produce
larger responses of the home interest-rate, output and consumption than in the foreign economy.
As shown in Figure 3c, in the limit, as ￿e ! +1; the nominal exchange rate is perfectly stabilized,
the variables have identical responses in both countries, and thus corresponds to those of a single
closed economy.31 In addition, changes in structural parameters don￿ t generically modify the picture
31Recall that our calibration is such that apart from the policy rules, the home and foreign economies are perfectly
symmetric.
36presented.
The basic version of the model cannot replicate the transmission of monetary policy observed in
a low-credibility regimes as long-term rates are tightly tied to expected future riskless short-term
rates. One key parameter, however, that allows us to deviate from the standard case and that
seems to explain the stylized facts reported in Figure 1a-1c is ￿: Figure 3b reports the model-based
responses of the same variables in the case that ￿ = 0:6: In that case, an unexpected increase in the
foreign short-term rate triggers a much larger increase in the home interest rate ￿ as observed in the
data ￿ as the wedge ￿t suddenly rises in response to an interest-rate increase in the foreign country.
This wedge suggests that in response to the foreign monetary shock, international investors require
a higher return on domestic (internationally traded) bonds than they do on foreign securities, even
after accounting for the rational expectation of nominal exchange rate changes.
Such an exchange-rate risk premium appears important to explain the stylized facts reported
above. In fact, in Figure 3b, not only do short- and long-term rates respond more strongly at
home than in the foreign country, but these interest-rate responses do also generate a larger drop
in the home country consumption. As in the data, output falls less than consumption due to the
fact that home-country net exports increase. Note also that while monetary policy reduces activity
in both regions, prices do increase in the home country as a result of the currency depreciation.
Interestingly, prices aggregated for both regions (dashed-dotted line) can also increase following the
monetary tightening, to the extent that in￿ ation in the depreciating country more than o⁄sets the
in￿ ation reduction in the other region. This can explain an apparent ￿price puzzle￿in the home
country or in the area as a whole, in response to monetary tightening.
The exercise just performed thus suggests that conditional on EA-wide (or German) monetary
shocks, changes in the risk premium on Italian and Spanish securities may provide an important
explanation for the large observed responses in bond yields, and the fact that consumption and
investment used to fall considerably more in those countries than in the rest of the EA.
5.3.2 Monetary union and changes in the monetary transmission mechanism
By adopting the euro as their currency, all EMU countries essentially eliminated exchange-rate
risks relative to the other member countries. Figure 3c reports the responses of the same variables
37in the case of a monetary union, when monetary policy is conducted according to the estimated
rule (16). Since both countries are symmetric in the calibration, they both respond identically to
the EA interest-rate shock.
Comparing Figures 3a-3b on one hand with Figure 3c on the other hand reveals important
di⁄erences in the responses to an unexpected increase in the interest rate set by the foreign central
bank in the pre-EMU regime, and the common central bank in the EMU regime. The model
predicts that the home economy bene￿ts in many respects from participating to the monetary
union, in response such a shock. In particular, by removing exchange-rate risks in the EMU
regime, home (short- and long-term) interest-rates increase by less, as we observed in the empirical
responses. As a result, home consumption falls by less and output remains more stable.
According to the model, removing exchange-rate risks may have helped stabilize not only coun-
tries such as Italy and Spain but also the entire EA. To isolate the e⁄ect of the exchange-rate risk,
we report in Figure 3d the model-based responses of the EA variables obtained by aggregating the
home and foreign responses, following a monetary shock in the foreign country. The ￿gure reveals
that the responses of short- and long-term interest rates, output, consumption and in￿ ation are all
more muted when we remove the risk-premium shock ￿t:
The EMU has not only contributed to smaller responses by removing exchange-rate risks. The
model predicts that a monetary policy that has more consistently aimed at stabilizing in￿ ation
and output in the EA, since the start of the EMU, should result in a smaller observed response of
aggregate economic activity and in￿ ation to monetary shocks, as observed in the data. To illustrate
this, Figure 3e shows the model-based responses of EA variables to a monetary tightening (of 100
bp) assuming two di⁄erent policy rules: the one estimated for the ECB (solid lines) and the one
estimated previously (by Angeloni and Dedola, 1999) for the Bundesbank (dashed lines). The
￿gure indicates that stronger responses by the ECB to in￿ ation and output ￿ uctuations, essentially
stemming from a very inertial rule, have resulted in smaller responses of economic activity and
in￿ ation. It is important to stress, however, that the smaller response of output and in￿ ation is
not due to the fact that the economy is less sensitive to monetary policy. All elasticities describing
the behavior of the private sector, such as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and so on
are maintained constant in this experiment. It is only the stronger commitment to in￿ ation and
38output stabilization that results in such an outcome.32
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided an empirical characterization of the monetary transmission mech-
anism in key European economies, exploiting the richness of the cross-country di⁄erences and the
fact that a major change in monetary regime has occurred in 1999 with the adoption of the euro by
11 European countries. The combination of the cross-country heterogeneity and the changes over
time provides a unique laboratory for the analysis of numerous macroeconomic indicators.
Focusing on six major European economies, we have argued that a large fraction of the ￿ uc-
tuations in these economic variables can be captured by a low-dimensional vector of common
components. This ￿nding is useful to the extent that it allows us to characterize the e⁄ects of
monetary shocks on all variables of interest, despite the fact that we have extremely short samples
with a relatively stable regime.
Looking at the EA as a whole, in the 1988-2007 sample, we have found that the responses
of key macroeconomic variables to monetary disturbances conceal important heterogeneity across
countries. Such responses can be rationalized by a two-country model, provided that we allow
for a disturbance in the uncovered-interest-rate parity condition, which may be interpreted as a
risk-premium shock. In addition despite the short samples, we have detected preliminary evidence
of important changes in the transmission of monetary policy since the start of the EMU.
We have argued that some of the changes since 1999 can be explained by the change in the
monetary regime. In particular, our model predicts that by removing an exchange-rate risk through
the monetary union, and by having a central bank more decisively focused on in￿ ation and output
stabilization, the impact of monetary disturbances on measures of economic activity has been
reduced, as observed in the data. While private consumption and investment in Italy and Spain
appear to have been especially hard hit by German monetary policy disturbances in the pre-EMU
period, the new monetary regime has contributed to stabilizing them more e⁄ectively, in part
32Boivin and Giannoni (2006a) argue that a stronger commitment to in￿ ation stabilization in US monetary policy
since the early 1980s can similarly explain the observed reduction in estimated responses of in￿ ation and output in
the US economy in the post-1980 period.
39because long-term interest rate have become much more e⁄ectively anchored in such countries
since the start of the monetary union.
We have also found that the exchange rate channel has become relatively more powerful in the
monetary union period, than in the previous decade and that national monetary aggregates appear
much less driven by euro area common shocks and show more heterogenous responses to monetary
policy shocks than most other macroeconomic variables.
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Figure 2. Responses of short and long-term interest rates to monetary shock in EA
Notes: First ￿ve subplots represent responses of interest rates in 1998-2007 sample. Bot-
tom right plot contains reponses for EMU period. Solid line: short-term interest rate;
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Figure 3a: Model-based responses to a 100bp monetary tightening in foreign country
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Figure 3b: Model-based responses to a 100bp monetary tightening in foreign
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Figure 3c: Model-based responses to a 100bp monetary tightening in common area
(monetary union case, ￿ = 0:6).
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Figure 3d: Model-based responses of aggregate EA variables to a 100bp monetary tightening
in foreign economy (solid lines: ￿ = 0; dashed lines: ￿ = 0:6).
























































Figure 3e: Model-based responses of EA variables to a 100bp monetary tightening in EA under
alternative policy rules (solid lines: ECB policy rule; dashed lines: Bundesbank policy rule).
54A Data description
The data were extracted from HAVER and their source is either the OECD￿ s Main Economic
Indicators (MEI) or Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) databases. The monetary aggregates
are obtained from the national central banks and from the ECB for the euro area. The national
accounts published in HAVER are available starting at di⁄erent dates: 1978 in France, 1981 in
Italy, 1988 in the Netherlands, 1991 in Germany, 1995 in Spain and Belgium. Some de￿ ators in the
euro area start in 1995. Missing data were backdated using yoy growth rates of an earlier vintage
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Figure A1: Main ￿nancial and monetary data series in EA and six countries
(year-over-year growth rates except for interest rates)







































Figure A2: Main price data series and GDP in EA and six countries
(year-over-year growth rates)

































Figure A3: Main activity series in EA and six countries
(year-over-year growth rates except for capacity utilisation)
































CPI inflation (Food and Energy)
Figure A4: Main activity and price series in EA and six countries
(year-over-year growth rates)



































Figure A5: Main price and labor market series in EA and six countries















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4C E⁄ects of oil price shocks
This section brie￿ y describes the e⁄ects of an unexpected increase in oil prices. Such a shock is an
ideal experiment in the sense that it a⁄ects simultaneously all EA countries, and it is, arguably, an
exogenous source of economic ￿ uctuations (see Hamilton, 2003; Cavallo and Wu, 2007; Blanchard
and Gal￿, 2008; and Kilian, 2008). The identi￿cation of the oil price shock is similar to the one in
Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008), although we implement it in the context of our FAVAR. Basically, the
oil price shock can a⁄ect all other latent and observed factors instantaneously and through them,
all indicators. However, we assume that the oil price responds to other factors only after a one
quarter lag.
Figures C1-C3 show the response of selected variables to a 10% increase in the yoy in￿ ation of
oil prices, both for the 1988-2007 sample (solid lines) and for the post-1999 sample (dashed-dotted
lines).
Interestingly, bond yields increase more in Italy and Spain than in the other countries or in
the EA as a whole, and consumption declines by more in Italy than in other countries as well.
This result is consistent with our ￿ndings in response to a monetary shock, and provides further
evidence that bond markets and credibility issues are the locus of an important asymmetry in
business cycle adjustments across countries prior to the EMU. In addition, CPI in￿ ation increases
by about 0.1% percent, re￿ ecting in the ￿rst few quarters an increase in the food and energy
component of CPI prices (not shown). We note that the responses of CPI in￿ ation rates tend to
be slightly less persistent in the recent sample, both at the EA level and in the countries reported.
This is consistent with our ￿nding, in response to monetary shocks, that the ECB monetary policy
has better anchored in￿ ation expectations than the national central banks had before the EMU.
Turning to quantities, we estimate that an increase in the price of oil reduces the yoy growth rate
of output by about 0.1% for the EA. This is broadly in line with Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008) who
emphasize a reduction in the e⁄ects of oil price shocks in the last two decades when compared with




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8D Model￿ s log-linearized equilibrium conditions
We use lower-case variables to denote percent deviations from the deterministic steady state, except
when noted.
The domestic household￿ s optimal plan of consumption (ct) over time involves the log-linear
Euler equation
￿t = ￿t+1 + Et (it ￿ ￿t+1) + ^ ￿t; (18)
where it ￿ log(It=I) corresponds to the deviation of the nominal interest rate from steady state,









ct + ￿!ct￿1 + ￿￿!ct+1 ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ !) ^ ￿t
i￿
; (19)
and the percent deviations of the discount factor ￿t from steady state evolve according to
^ ￿t = ￿ ￿ct + ￿t: (20)
Note that in the absence of habit formation, the above expression reduces to: Et￿1￿t = ￿￿Et￿1ct:
Domestic output yt depends on home tradable (yHt) and nontradable (yNt) output:
yt = ￿yHt + (1 ￿ ￿)yNt (21)
where the demand for home tradables
yHt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ (￿Ht ￿ ￿Ft) + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿xt + (1 ￿ ￿)x￿
t] + ￿ct + (1 ￿ ￿)c￿
t (22)
depends on the terms of trade ￿Ht ￿ log(PFt=PHt); ￿Ft ￿ log(P￿
Ht=P￿
Ft); as well as the home and




consumption in both regions. The demand for home nontradables is given by
yNt = ￿￿xt + ct: (23)
The share of net exports in GDP is given by nxt ￿ (PHtYHt ￿ PTtCTt)=(YtPt) and is assumed to
have a steady-state value of 0. A ￿rst-order approximation yields
nxt = ￿ [yHt ￿ ct ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Ht ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)xt]: (24)
The terms of trade and the relative price of nontradables evolve according to
￿H;t = ￿H;t￿1 + ￿F;t ￿ ￿H;t (25)
xt = xt￿1 + ￿N;t ￿ ￿H;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿H;t ￿ ￿H;t￿1): (26)
A log-linearization of the optimal price-setting condition for domestic intermediate producers
yields an extension of the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve
Et￿1 (￿k;t ￿ ￿￿k;t￿1) = ￿Et￿1mck;t + ￿Et￿1 (￿k;t+1 ￿ ￿￿k;t) (27)
where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)=(￿ (1 + ’￿)) > 0, in each of the sectors k = H;F; and the marginal
70cost in the domestic traded-goods sector satis￿es
mcH;t = ’yHt ￿ (1 + ’)at ￿ ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Ht + (1 ￿ ￿)xt; (28)
while
mcN;t = ’yNt ￿ (1 + ’)at ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿xt (29)
in the domestic nontraded-goods sector. In￿ ation of the GDP de￿ ator is given by
￿Y t = ￿￿Ht + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Nt (30)
while CPI in￿ ation is
￿t = ￿￿Ht + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Nt + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿H;t ￿ ￿H;t￿1); (31)
where the last term captures the e⁄ects of imported goods.
Given the imperfect pass-through, imported goods in￿ ation ￿F;t (in domestic currency) is also
determined by a Phillips curve-type equation
Et￿1
￿
￿F;t ￿ ~ ￿￿F;t￿1
￿
= ~ ￿Et￿1^  F;t + ￿Et￿1
￿
￿F;t+1 ￿ ~ ￿￿F;t
￿
(32)
where ~ ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ~ ￿
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿~ ￿
￿
=~ ￿ > 0, and ^  F;t represents the percent deviation from steady state
(equal to 1) of the gap between the foreign price expressed in domestic currency and the domestic
price of the same goods. That price gap evolves in turn according to
^  F;t = ^  F;t￿1 + ￿et + ￿￿
Ft ￿ ￿Ft (33)
where ￿￿
Ft is the in￿ ation of foreign tradable goods in foreign currency, while ￿Ft is in￿ ation in the
prices of the same goods in the home country.
While equations (18)￿ (33) determine home variables, a similar set of equations determines the
corresponding foreign variables. We also need a speci￿cation of monetary policy in each region. As
mentioned in the text, we assume, in the pre-EMU case that the interest rate is set in each region
according to the linear interest-rate rules (14) and (15). Instead in the EMU case, we assume that
the nominal exchange rate is ￿xed, ￿et = 0; that short-term interest rates are equal in both regions,
and that the EA-wide interest rate iea
t is set according to the rule (16).
Finally, to close the model, we use our linearized UIP condition
it ￿ i￿
t = Et￿et+1 + ￿t (34)
and the linearized condition characterizing the evolution of foreign debt
bt = ￿￿1bt￿1 + nxt:
For reference, the percent deviations of the real exchange rate from its steady-state value of 1 can
be expressed as follows
qt = ^  Ft + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Ft + ￿￿Ht + (1 ￿ ￿)(x￿
t ￿ xt):
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